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government of responsibility for the loss of China to the Communists. However, instead of silencing domestic
critics of the administration's China policy, it provided fuel for further criticism at home and an opportunity
for anti-American propaganda in China, thereby hurting U.S. interests.
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The Failure of the China White Paper 
Bill Rintz 
 
Upon reading the China White Paper prior to its publication, George 
Kennan declared it the greatest state document ever created by the American 
government. 
1
  However, following its August 1949 release, the report, officially 
called United States Relations with China, sparked significant controversy and 
inspired such vehement opposition that it is not unreasonable to call it a 
complete failure.   Published by the Truman administration with the intent of 
absolving the United States of responsibility for the fall of Chiang Kai-shek and 
the victory of the Chinese Communists, the document had far-reaching 
consequences that fell far from its original intent.  Not only did the White Paper 
fail to mollify domestic detractors of the U.S.’s China policy, it inspired far more 
criticism than would have existed without the report’s release.  Furthermore, 
its publication increased already fervent anti-Americanism within China, hurt 
the causes of the Chinese liberal forces the U.S. purported to support, and gave 
the Chinese Communist Party fuel for virulent attacks on the United States.  
By 1949, in the eyes of the United States, the situation in China was 
dire.  A country which had traditionally been an American ally seemed all but 
lost to Communist control.  The man whom had received the backing of the 
U.S. government, Chiang Kai-Shek, leader of the Nationalist regime, was found 
to be completely unreliable as a tool of opposition to the Chinese Communists.  
Not only had Nationalist military campaigns resulted in defeat after defeat, but 
reports of corruption and dictatorial behavior among the Nationalist regime 
were rampant. Although the Truman administration had long-since given up on 
Chiang Kai-Shek, on June 2, the Truman administration failed to extend the 
China Aid Act in support of the Nationalist regime, a final symbol of the dashed 
hopes of blocking the Chinese Communists road to power.  The menacing 
prospect of a communist China was inevitable.  
The Truman administration faced extreme heat for what was seen as 
the loss of China.  Most of the criticism was facilitated by the China Lobby, 
which was “composed of people from a whole political spectrum, from the far 
right to the far left, who had only one thing in common: … they were in 
complete support of Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationalists.”
2
  Because of Chiang 
Kai-Shek’s popularity within the U.S. as a perceived symbol of American ideals, 
sentiment among the public, the press, and certain members of Congress was 
that the U.S. government had abandoned America’s only hope in saving China.  
                                                 
 
1
 Nancy B. Tucker, ed., China Confidential: American Diplomats and 




 Ibid., 62. 
 77
The Truman administration felt it was imperative to respond to such 
accusations.  Hence, the idea of the White Paper, as a refutation of such 
criticism, was conceived by members of the State Department, who broached 
the possibility with Secretary of State Dean Acheson.  Acheson then consulted 
with President Truman, who became “enthusiastic” about the project, giving 
his approval to begin work in the compilation of the important document.
3
        
The purpose of the White Paper was to set the facts straight on the 
difficult situation in China, primarily in regards to U.S. policy.  As State 
Department official John S. Service later said, “[those in the administration] 
were going to counterattack and defend themselves, prove they had done 
everything to support Chiang, that it was not our fault that the Communists 
were winning. It was Chiang’s own failings.”
4
  Another State Department 
official, John Melby, who compiled much of the actual report, likewise sensed 
that the purpose of the White Paper was to “call off the dogs from the China 
Lobby.”
5
  Truman felt that because the government had previously been 
hesitant to reveal information to the public, it had opened itself up to the 
distortion and misrepresentation if its China policy. He therefore stated that his 
primary purpose in releasing the report was to inform the public of the facts, 
with the goal of creating “informed and intelligent public opinion.”
6
  Truman 
intended the report to be an objective, frank record of U.S. involvement in 
China, feeling that full disclosure would be enough to absolve his 
administration of the current situation. 
Work began on the White Paper in the spring of 1949.  The head of 
the project was to be Director of the Office of far Eastern Affairs, John 
Butterworth, who delegated most of the responsibility to lower State 
Department officers, one of whom was John Melby.
7
  One indication of the 
high priority placed on the project was Melby’s claim that he worked on the 
project 18 hours a day from March until August, combing through hundreds of 
thousands of documents. With the State Department working with all 
deliberate speed, the report was nearly finished by late June.
8
 
The resulting White Paper was over one-thousand pages in length, 
mainly composed of documents that had previously been classified.  The only 
documents contained within the report came from State Department files for 
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the sake of speed, because the hope was that the report would be issued as 
soon as possible.  The White Paper addressed U.S. policy towards China since 
1843, although the highest degree of attention was placed on the period 1944 
to 1949.  In thirteen chapters, the voluminous record covered everything from 
Nationalist-Communist relations, to George Marshall’s mission, to U.S. 
economic aid in support of the Nationalist regime.  The administration hoped 
that the record would speak for itself, displaying earnest U.S. attempts to 
support Chiang Kai-Shek, and demonstrating that the failures of the Nationalist 
regime were entirely their own. 
Despite this hope, a fourteen-page letter of transmittal from Secretary 
of State Dean Acheson’s to the President was included at the beginning of the 
White Paper.  As the letter was essentially Acheson’s interpretation of the 
record contained therein, it became the most controversial part of the entire 
document.  Acheson emphasized the fact that assistance to the nationalist 
regime had been “pursued vigorously.”
9
 However, he likewise stressed the 
point that over the course of the war, the Nationalists “had sunk into 
corruption, into a scramble for place and power, and into reliance on the 
United States to win the war for them and to preserve their own domestic 
supremacy.”
10
  Acheson found the many reasons leading the Nationalist failure 
detailed in the document; none of them, he claimed, having to do with lack of 
U.S. aid.  Along with exonerating the U.S., Acheson also depicted the Chinese 
Communists as an agent of Soviet imperialism.  As the traditional friend of the 
Chinese people, he determined the U.S. had done all it could to prevent this 
foreign domination.  However, there was nothing further within the U.S.’s 
power, Acheson expressed, which could have altered such results.  The 
Secretary of State concluded with an indication towards future U.S. policy, 
stating that “the democratic individualism of China” would reassert itself, and 




Even before the White Paper’s release, there was much controversy 
and skepticism surrounding it.   Those within the U.S. government who were 
able to read the document prior to its release did not all share George Kennan’s 
appraisal of the report’s merit.   Many reservations were expressed to the 
administration, either about the content of the report or the timing of its 
release.  There existed the fundamental question as to whether the release of 
the White Paper was within the U.S.’s best interests.  For instance, the National 
Military Establishment’s position was that by “exposing the only group in China 
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which we could assist, we are destroying that group.”
12
  The sentiment was 
that it would be extremely unwise to discredit the Nationalists as long as they 
were still fighting to contain the Communist forces.   The Joint Chiefs of Staff 
expressed similar concerns in that the White Paper, in extensively explaining 
the failures of the Nationalist government, made the CCP appear relatively 
blameless, giving the Communists opportunity for propaganda.
13
   
Colonel Henry A. Byrode, who had aided George Marshall in his 
mission to China, shared his own reservations with Acheson.  Although 
acknowledging that the Nationalist forces would surely fall, he likewise felt that 
as long as they were fighting the Communists, there should be no criticism that 
might hasten their collapse.  Therefore, he suggested a delay in the White 
Paper’s publication until further developments took place, such as the 
expected fall of Canton to the Communists.  Byrode was furthermore 
concerned about the general affect of the White Paper on the Far East.  He was 
of the opinion that the White Paper gave the impression that the U.S. was 
washing its hands of China, which would result in feelings of discouragement in 
the region and open the door for the further spread of communism. 
Acheson forwarded some of these reservations to Truman prior to the 
White Paper’s release in a July 29
th
 memorandum.  Despite giving consideration 
to the aforementioned concerns, Acheson ultimately determined that the 
publication of the report should go forward, feeling that “the basic necessity of 
informing Congressional and public opinion regarding the facts… is believed to 
outweigh the risks involved.”
14
  The only consideration affecting the timing of 
the White Paper’s release was that the Ambassador to China, Leighton Stuart, 
should receive an exit permit from Chinese authorities and be outside of China 
at the time of release.  However, any additional lapse of time, Acheson felt, 
was unnecessary.  Therefore, with the President’s approval, the White Paper 
was released at noon on August 5, 1949.
15
 
Immediately, there were a multitude of domestic criticisms levied 
against the Truman administration and the State Department.  Despite the 
intention of warding off the China Lobby, the White Paper instantaneously had 
the opposite effect of igniting even more virulent criticism in the press.  One 
New York Times editorial called it “a sorry record of well-meaning mistakes.”
16
  
Time referred to it as a “lawyer’s brief.”
17
  Alfred Kohlberg, an active member 
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of the China Lobby, called it “the story of the American betrayal of the 
Republic of China.”
18
  However, there were none in the press who were quick 
to praise the White Paper, and the best reception it was given was its 
acceptance at face value.  
The same reservations that existed prior to the White Paper’s release 
now became public points of contention, and long-standing arguments of the 
China Lobby intensified now that the report provided a new source of material 
for the attack.  Concerns over the timing of the White Paper’s publication had 
been brought to the attention of Acheson but were disregarded.  Now that the 
debate had entered the public domain, the White Paper was denounced as 
undermining ongoing Nationalist opposition to the Communists.  Additionally, 
critics neither interpreted the document in the same way Acheson did nor in 
the way Truman hoped they would, rather claiming that the U.S. had not done 
all it could to aid the Nationalist government.  Among the arguments were that 
more extensive U.S. military aid would have enabled the Nationalist regime to 
achieve victory, that George Marshall’s mission to China had attempted to 
force the Nationalists into accommodation with the Communists, and even that 
pro-Communists were working against U.S. interests within the State 
Department.
19
  Furthermore, despite the administration’s earnest insistence 
on the report’s impartiality, critics referred to the White Paper as an attempt at 
“self-justification, which certainly is the enemy of objective analysis.”
20
  It 
quickly became apparent that what was supposed to be a frank record of the 
facts was not seen as such.   
From the outset, the White Paper had no chance at achieving its 
stated goals.  Regardless of what the White Paper contained, it was doomed to 
be criticized.  One of the concerns of the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed prior to 
its release was that the contents of the White Paper should be carefully 
examined to make sure there was no information that might jeopardize 
American security, and that any such information should be removed.  
Although Acheson addressed these concerns and made necessary alterations 
based on the recommendation, the State Department became accused of 
omitting or suppressing information that did not coincide with the Truman 
administration’s policy.  Specifically, Walter Judd alleged before the House of 
Representatives that there were sixteen cases in which there was information 
omitted or distorted within the White Paper.
21
  Such charges forced Acheson 
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to make public statements refuting any such allegations in order to defend 
the integrity of the report. 
All in all, the Truman administration had failed in its goals and had 
badly blundered in its estimation of the White Paper’s domestic reception.  As 
Service later noted, “in hindsight it’s remarkable that intelligent and 
experienced men in the [State Department], people like Dean Acheson and so 
on, had so little realization what a hot topic China was.”
22
  The State 
Department and the Truman administration had encountered heated criticism 
from the China Lobby before, but the White Paper had the effect of inspiring 
rather than quelling such arguments.  However, despite the fact that the White 
Paper was intended to address the domestic political situation, the unintended 
consequences within China perhaps affected U.S. interests even more so.    
Prior to the release of the White Paper, an “atmosphere of mutual 
distrust and antagonism” between the U.S. and the Chinese Communists had 
already been fostered over the preceding years.  Such tension contributed to 
the events of mid-1949, when the CCP accused U.S. consul general Angus Ward 
of espionage in Shenyang, resulting in the expulsion of him and his staff from 
China.
23
  In another case, vice consul William Olive was arrested for allegedly 
impeding a Communist procession and was severely beaten.
24
  Despite this, 
general animosity for the United States was still not yet prevalent among the 
Chinese public.  However, the release of the White Paper ensured that this 
would not remain the case for long.   
With the issuance of the White Paper, Gordon H. Chang has noted, 
“previous sporadic expressions of anti-Americanism on the mainland became a 
nationwide campaign vilifying the United States.”
25
  As in the U.S, the 
document immediately resulted in widespread condemnation of U.S. 
intervention in China.  Knight Biggerstaff, an American then living in China, 
wrote that the White Paper “touched off an almost hysterical outburst in the 
Nanking Press”.
26
  Indeed, the frenzied reaction was widespread throughout 
the entire Chinese press.  Editorials on the White Paper, mainly focused on 
attacking Acheson’s letter of transmittal, interpreted it as “a testimony of guilt” 
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by the U.S. government.
 27
  In an article in Ta Kung Pao, the author 
described the report as “a confession of the diabolical schemes on the part of 
American Imperialism for aggression on China.”
28
  The newspapers likewise 
printed the harsh critiques of the White Paper that were generated by public 
discussions held on the topic.   As Biggerstaff noted, such articles and diatribes 
were ubiquitous for weeks, and only one issue of the official Communist 
newspaper failed to mention the White Paper in the span of a month. Extra 
pages were frequently necessary in order to make room for all the assaults.
 29
    
Mao Zedong himself responded as strongly as anyone, writing a 
succession of five articles “pointing out the illusions some Chinese still 
harbored about the United States, recounting the history and ultimate failure 
of American aggression against China, and dissecting the misperceptions, 
failures, and confusions plaguing American policy.”
30
  Mao was not hesitant to 
note the value of the White Paper to the Chinese Communists, declaring that 
“now an opportunity has been found in the discussion of the U.S. White 
Paper,” even declaring that the Chinese should thank Acheson for his disclosure 
of U.S. intervention.
31
  In effect, the Truman administration had given the CCP 
a chance to rally support for their cause, and in the process, generate virulent 
anti-American sentiment. 
A study of newspaper articles reveals evidence of a broad increase in 
anti-Americanism.  One such example is that while all trademarks and other 
public business had traditionally been conducted in English, following the 
issuance of the White Paper, the public use of English was seen as a colonial 
mentality, and the use of Chinese was thereafter adopted in many cases.
32
 
Additionally, foreign news agencies were forced to cease their operations, 
customs duties were required to be paid by any person owning American or 
British-owned vehicles, and the newspapers celebrated the fact that Americans 
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were flocking to apply for exit permits, indicating that anti-Americanism was 
becoming more widespread among different areas of Chinese society. 
However, a more harmful consequence caused by the release of the 
White Paper lay in Acheson’s reference to “democratic individualism,” which 
sparked a firestorm of responses in the Chinese press.
33
  Acheson’s reference 
was to the so-called “middle forces,” or those liberals in Chinese society who 
represented an alternative to both the Communists and the Nationalists.
 34
  By 
this point, most of the middle forces had been incorporated into the 
Communist revolution, and one such party, the Democratic League, even 
published its own article condemning the White Paper.
35
 However, there 
remained some democratic liberals that were unallied with the Communists.  
Therefore, Mao Zedong repeatedly took up the issue in his series of five 
articles, using the opportunity the White Paper afforded to call upon them to 
join the Communist cause and to help win over any who had yet to take a side 
in revolutionary conflict.
36
  Following his lead, journalists responded with 
additional editorials mirroring this sentiment.   
By mentioning the middle forces in the White Paper, Acheson had 
been the one to expose them to such analysis.  Furthermore, by pegging the 
U.S.’s hope on the middle forces to overthrow Soviet aggression in China, 
Acheson inadvertently hurt their cause.  Acheson was informed of the opinion 
of one Chinese man that the reference to democratic individualism had 
weakened the middle force’s position.  It not only exposed them to allegations 
that they were receiving aid from the U.S., but it motivated some of them to 
denounce the White Paper in order to put themselves above suspicion.
37
  
Another such liberal identified himself and ten others whom the White Paper 
had caused to come under the suspicion of the CCP.  It was reported to John 
Butterworth that “they question whether [the] USA wants them to continue 
their efforts by exposing them to danger.”
38
  Therefore, even such a seemingly 
innocuous comment within the White Paper had a significant negative impact 
on U.S. interests. 
Regardless of intent, the evidence demonstrates that the 
consequences of the White Paper’s release were far from what the Truman 
administration might have expected.  From the outset, the administration was 
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blinded themselves to the implications of the White Paper in an desperate 
effort to counterattack the China Lobby and to absolve themselves of 
responsibility for the loss of China to the Communists. The Truman 
administration failed to foresee how their attempt at impartially disclosing the 
U.S.’s intervention in China’s affairs could turn back on them.  It not only 
provided additional material for the China Lobby to criticize, but also gave the 
Chinese Communists a much-welcome opportunity to rail against American 
imperialism.  Moreover, Acheson’s reference to democratic individualism 
unintentionally sealed the fate of the forces that represented the last hope of 
countering Chinese communism.  On October 1
st
, 1949 Mao Zedong declared 
the founding of the People’s Republic of China and President Truman’s 
domestic political situation was no better off than before the White Paper’s 
release.  Regardless of George Kennan’s initial opinion, the White Paper had 
failed.  
  
 
